The paper examines formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) as a network formation game. We build an n-country model with quasi-linear utility and a continuum of differentiated industrial goods. Countries can differ in the size of the industrial goods industry and the purchasing power. We show that countries with similar characteristics are more likely to reach FTAs. When countries are symmetric and industrial commodities are not extremely substitutable from one another, we show that the complete global free trade network is the unique pairwise stable (Jackson and Wolinsky, JET, 1996). We also compare customs unions and free trade areas in the incentives to form FTAs with outsiders under symmetric and asymmetric countries.
Introduction
The network of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) covers most countries in a complex way. The tendency towards "regionalism," a movement to form regional trade agreements, has been steadily growing especially since 1980s (Bhagwati, 1993) . Whether PTAs serve as "building blocs" or "stumbling blocs" is a central question on this topic (Bhagwati, 1993) . Of course, multilateral trade liberalization efforts and PTA formation interact with each other.
1 However, putting this feature aside for a while, another important question remains. Will successive PTA formation alone effectively achieve global free trade network is a unique stable network, the world is likely to attain global free trade, building many bilateral FTAs (unless there are constraints over admissible set of FTAs).
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In order to Þnd stable free trade networks, we need to analyze each country's incentive to sign or abandon an FTA. As Krugman (1991b) and Grossman and Helpman (1995) suggest, asymmetry of countries is an important factor when we assess countries' incentives for FTAs.
Viner (1950) , on the other hand, suggests that substitutability of commodities traded internationally is also an important factor. The model of this paper is so general that it enables us to observe how these factors play in countries' decisions as to whether to have an FTA with other countries.
Our model is described as follows. There are n countries in the world, and there is a numeraire good and a continuum of differentiated industrial commodities. Countries may be different in the purchasing power (population size) and the size of the industrial goods industry (measure of Þrms). Each of the differentiated commodities is produced at the same marginal cost by one Þrm that belongs to one of n countries. Each consumer has a common quasi-linear utility function, in which substitutability of industrial commodities is parameterized. Each country has a tariff schedule for imported industrial commodities, and an FTA between countries i and j simply means that countries i and j simultaneously eliminate tariffs on commodities imported from countries j and i, respectively.
With a quasi-linear utility function, we can capture important factors for welfare impacts of an FTA. When the utility function is quasi-linear, social welfare, which is merely a representative consumer's utility, can be decomposed into two parts: the consumer's gross utility and the (industrial) trade surplus that is deÞned as export proÞts minus import payments in the industrial goods sector. An FTA with another country is likely to raise the gross utility, although the second-best effect (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956 ) may sometimes outweigh general beneÞts from tariff reduction. 12 Thus, whether an FTA enhances social welfare can 11 To derive a deÞnite prediction regarding the time-path to global free trade, we may need to build a dynamic network formation model with farsightedness. Mukunoki and Tachi (2001) show in a dynamic, symmetric, three-country model that under a certain parameter values, only one bilateral FTA may be signed in equilibrium so that global free trade is not attained. As Kennan and Riezman (1990) suggest, countries in a bilateral FTA may in some cases prefer the current situation to global free trade. Then, each member country may not sign a new bilateral free trade agreement with an outside country since it would induce an FTA between spoke countries, effectively attaining global free trade, in the future. However, extending Mukunoki and Tachi's (2001) analysis to the case of many countries is not an easy task. 12 If tariffs have been imposed on a large portion of commodities, it may not be welfare-improving to get rid of tariffs for a small portion of commodities since it enlarges distortions between these commodities and be judged in many cases by observing its impact on the (industrial) trade surplus.
The effect on a country's trade surplus of signing an FTA with another country can be further decomposed into two: one on the trade surplus between these two countries (the direct surplus effect) and that on the trade surplus with third countries (the third country effect). The latter effect is always positive, since the country's export to third countries is not affected by the FTA, while its imports from them decrease since their commodities become relatively more expensive by the agreement. In contrast, the direct surplus effect can go either way. The sign of the direct surplus effect depends on the two countries' characteristics such as purchasing power, the size of the industrial good industry, and their current partner countries. Let us consider, for example, an FTA between a highly-industrialized small country and a less-industrialized large country. The FTA increases trade ßows from the former to the latter disproportionately, dramatically increasing the trade surplus of the small highly-industrialized country and decreasing that of the large less-industrialized country. The direct surplus effect for the large less-industrialized country is likely to be negative, and it may outweigh the third country effect. Consequently, the large less-industrialized country is likely to oppose to sign the FTA. 13 If two countries are similar in their characteristics, however, the direct surplus effects would be small in magnitude irrespective of their signs, and they are likely to beneÞt from signing an FTA.
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The main results of this paper are as follows. When all countries are symmetric in their purchasing powers and industry sizes, we show that the global free trade network, a network in which any pair of countries has an FTA, is pairwise stable (Proposition 1). 15 If the ones with high tariffs. 13 It is interesting to notice that countries in our model have a view that Krugman (1991b) calls GATTthink: (1) Exports are good, (2) Imports are bad, (3) and other things being equal, an equal increase in imports and exports is good. Our model gives an economic reasoning to this "enlightened mercantilism," as Bagwell and Staiger (1999) does in a model that examines the economic role of the GATT/WTO principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination. 14 This result is not speciÞc to our segmented market assumption. Furusawa and Konishi (2002) shows that even in competitive market economy, similar countries tend to have incentives to sign an FTA since it allows these countries to substitute imports from the third countries by the ones from their partners. 15 A simpliÞcation assumption adopted throughout this paper is that countries do not adjust their tariff rates on commodities from third countries when they sign FTAs. It is well-known that the optimal tariff rates charged by the members of customs unions or free trade areas may change as the sizes of groups become large. 17 This tariff rate adjustments potentially affect the incentives to form FTAs later in the process of FTA formation. We adopted this assumption by two reasons. 18 First, given the existence of the GATT multinational tariff negotiations, it is unclear if countries are charging optimal tariffs to the countries which they free trade network is pairwise stable when tariffs are endogeneously determined (c.f. our Proposition 2 and Remark 2). 16 In fact, we have effectively shown an even stronger result: The world free trade is always attained in the long run from any initial free trade network, if countries myopically make decisions on formations of FTAs.
Given the complications of the free trade networks, myopic behaviors by countries may be justiÞed. 2 The Model
Overview
Let N be the set of n countries (n ≥ 2), each of which is populated by a continuum of identical consumers who consume a continuum of horizontally differentiated commodities that are indexed by ω ∈ [0, 1], as well as a numeraire good. A differentiated commodity can be considered as a variety of an industrial good. Each industrial commodity ω is produced by one Þrm which is also indexed by the same ω. Each Þrm is owned equally by all domestic consumers who receive equal shares of all Þrms' proÞts. The numeraire good is produced competitively, on the other hand. Each consumer is endowed with l units of labor, which is used for production of the industrial and numeraire goods. Each unit of labor produces one unit of the numeraire good, so that the wage rate equals 1. We also assume that industrial commodities are produced with a linear technology, and normalize the unit labor requirement to be equal to 0 for each industrial commodity, without loss of generality. Alternatively, we can interpret the model such that each consumer is endowed with l units of the numeraire good, which can be transformed by a linear technology into industrial commodities.
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In country i (i = 1, 2, · · · , n), measure µ i of consumers and measure s i of Þrms that produce industrial commodities are located. Thus, country i produces s i industrial commodities, which are consumed in every country in the world. We assume that the markets 19 Due to the normalization, however, production of industrial commodities does not require any numeraire good as an input in our model.
are segmented so that Þrms can perfectly price discriminate among different countries. We normalize the size of total population so that P n k=1 µ k = 1 as well as
The ratio s i /µ i measures country i's industrialization level. The higher the ratio, the higher the country's industrialization level. This ratio plays an important role later in our analysis. Country i imposes a speciÞc tariff at a rate of t i j on the imports of the industrial commodities that are produced in country j. For simplicity, we assume that every commodity produced in country j faces the same tariff rate t i j . 20 Since we assume that there is no commodity tax, we have t i i = 0. We also assume that the countries do not impose tariffs on the numeraire good which may be traded internationally to balance the trade. Tariff revenue is redistributed equally to domestic consumers.
Consumer Demands
A representative consumer's utility is represented by the following quasi-linear utility function:
where q : [0, 1] → < + is an integrable consumption function, and q 0 denotes the consumption level of the numeraire good. 21 The second last term represents the substitutability among differentiated commodities, which may become clearer if we notice
Letting y denote the consumer's income, the budget constraint can be written as
wherep : [0, 1] → < + denotes the consumer price function. The Þrst order condition for the consumer's maximization problem gives us the inverse demand function for each good ω:
Integrating over [0, 1], we obtain
(ω)dω, 20 In our simple model, country i's optimal tariff rates are the same across all commodities imported from country j. 21 This utility function is a continuous-goods version of the ones of Shubik (1984) and Yi (1996 Yi ( , 2000 who analyze the case where there are only Þnitely many differentiated commodities. Our continuum of commodity setup is based on Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002).
or
Substituting this equation back into the Þrst order condition, we obtain
Equilibrium in Country i
Letting p i (ω) andP i denote the producer price for commodity ω sold in country i, and the average consumer price in country i, respectively, a representative consumer's demands in country i for a commodity ω produced in country j can be written as
The Þrm ω in country j chooses {p
The Þrst order condition for this maximization gives us
for any i. Notice that p i (ω) does not vary with ω. Prices charged by Þrms depend only on the import country's tariff policies. For simplicity, we henceforth suppress the argument ω.
It follows from (4) that country i's average consumer price is calculated as
Thus, country i's average consumer priceP i is given bỹ
Substituting (5) into (4) yields the equilibrium producer price that each Þrm in country j charges for the market of country i as a function of country i's tariff vector
22 In country i, consumer price of commodity ω produced in country j isp
Then it follows from (3) that a representative consumer's demand in country i for a commodity produced in country j is
Notice that p i j (t i ) = βq i j (t i ) holds for any tariff vector t i .
Social Welfare
Under the world tariff vector t = (t 1 , ..., t n ), each Þrm in country i earns the proÞts:
Country i's per capita tariff revenue is
A representative consumer's income in country i is the sum of labor income l, redistributed tariff revenue T i (t i ), and the proÞt shares of the Þrms in country i, s i π i (t)/µ i :
Then it follows from (2) that
where
Substituting this demand function for the numeraire good into (1) and letting q i (t i )
represent country i's equilibrium consumption plan function under tariff t i , i.e., q i (t i ) = (q i j (t i )) j∈N , we obtain a representative consumer's utility in country i as a function of the world tariff vector, which can be considered as country i's per capita social welfare:
with
, and X i (t −i ) represent a consumer's gross utility, (industrial) import payments, and (industrial) export proÞts, respectively. 23 Country i's social welfare consists of a consumer's gross utility V i (t i ), and the per-capita industrial trade surplus
welfare through the effects on
Other countries' tariffs also affect country i's social welfare through the effect on
Now, we examine the effects of tariff changes on the three components of social welfare:
We notice from (11)- (13) that an increase in a tariff rate affects these components only through the changes in consumption of industrial commodities. We see from (6) that the consumption of an industrial commodity depends on the tariff rate imposed on that commodity and the average tariff rate, i.e., q
can write, for example,
). An increase in t i j directly affects q i j , and indirectly affects through an increase in the average tariff rates of country i on all industrial goods consumed in country i, q
As for the effect on V i (t i ), for example, we have
An increase in another country's tariff rate on country i's commodity affects the export proÞts X i (t −i ) in a similar fashion. We can easily obtain the following lemma that shows the effects of raising a tariff rate on the three components of social welfare.
Lemma 1
The Þrst order effects of raising t i j on V i and M i and the effects of raising t j i on 23 We should notice that utility derived from the numeraire good consumption in V i (t i ) corresponds to the case where the entire amount of the numeraire good produced from an individual's labor endowment is consumed. A consumer may not exactly demand l units of the numeraire good and hence V i (t i ) may not represent actual gross utility in any situation. But, since l is a Þxed number, this possible discrepancy does not affect any decision of any agent.
It may appear that an increase in a tariff rate of country i, say t i j necessarily decreases the domestic consumer's gross utility V i . Each consumer in country i reduces the consumption of country j's commodities as a consequence, which is detrimental. However, each agent consumes other commodities more than before at the same time, which tends to increase the consumer's gross utility. The latter indirect effect may outweigh the former so that an increase in a tariff rate may increase the domestic consumer's gross utility, if the industrial commodities are highly substitutable. Similarly, an increase in a tariff rate may not always decrease the import payments. If the industrial commodities are highly substitutable, the resulting decrease in q i j may be outweighed by increases in q i k for k 6 = i, k. It is easy to see from the lemma that an increase in another country's tariff decreases the domestic proÞts obtained from the export to that country. The next section discusses the effects of a change in a tariff rate on the three components of social welfare in more detail. Now, let us derive the optimal tariffs. Country i's optimal tariff maximizes
represent the set of countries that produce commodities on which country i does not impose tariffs. (Notice that C i includes country i itself since t i i = 0.) We consider here the situation in which country i has signed FTAs, rather than CUs, with all other countries in C i . Therefore, country i chooses its external tariffs without any coordination with other countries in C i . The optimal tariff given country i's free trade network C i is described as follows. As the following lemma shows, a country's optimal tariff rates only depend on its own characteristics. 24 In particular, they do not depend on other countries' characteristics at all due to the separability of a consumer's utility function.
Lemma 2 Country i's optimal tariff rate τ i is a function of s i , s
, and pa-rameters α, β and δ:
Moreover, it is increasing in s i , and decreasing in s C i . Thus, a country of size s i has the highest optimal tariff rate when s C i = s i , or C i = {i}, and a more industrialized country, whose s i tends to be high, has a higher optimal tariff rate given that s C i is constant.
3 Free Trade Agreements
Incentives to sign an FTA
Let us consider an FTA between countries i and j, such that they eliminate all tariffs imposed on commodities imported from each other, but not the tariffs imposed on other commodities. We assume for simplicity that they keep the tariffs on other commodities imported from outside countries unchanged. For an FTA to be signed, both countries i and j must beneÞt from the agreement. That is, we must have both (i)
The condition (i), for example, can be written as
, and 
In particular, in the case where s k = 1/n for any k and the original tariff rate does not exceed the optimal tariff rate that is obtained when k does not have any FTA (C i = {i}),
i.e., τ (n) = τ i (1/n, 1/n; α, β, δ), it is sufficient that δ ≤ 10β for condition (ii) to be satisÞed.
Remark 1 Note that condition (i) is satisÞed if 1−2s
. This corresponds to the second best effect: In an economy with distortions, removing tax distortions partially may reduce efficiency (see Dixit, 1975, and Hatta, 1977) . When a tariff on a commodity is eliminated, distortions between this commodity and untaxed commodities shrink, whereas distortions with taxed commodities expand. Thus, if there are more untaxed commodities than taxed commodities, the second best theory tells us that a consumer's gross utility is likely to rise. The condition s
matches exactly to this observation.
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Turning to condition (ii), the right-hand side is positive only when s
. Thus, condition (ii) is meaningful only when (i) is not satisÞed, and it shows that the detrimental second best effect is negligible if the rate of the tariffs, which cause distortions in the Þrst place, is small.
Next, we turn to investigating the effect of an FTA between countries i and j on the industrial trade surplus. Letting M i k and X i k be country i's (per capita) import from country k and country i's (per capita) export to country k, respectively: i.e.,
we can rewrite country i's industrial trade surplus as follows.
25 The term An FTA between i and j only involves changes in t i and t j so that it does not affect
for any k 6 = i, j. Consequently, a change in country i's industrial trade surplus can be written
The third country effect, represented by the terms in the parentheses, is always positive since the reduction of t i j makes commodities imported from country j relatively cheaper, and country i's imports from these third countries decrease, i.e., ∆M i k (t i ) < 0. Although the third country effect works positively for countries i and j, it implies that the FTA between them hurts all other countries.
Having shown that the third country effect is positive, let us now investigate the direct surplus effect, which can be rewritten as follows from the deÞnitions of
, where θ i = s i /µ i is the level of country i's industrialization (per capita number of Þrms in country i). The higher θ i and the lower θ j , the more the industrial trade surplus increases.
Countries with different industrialization levels tend to have asymmetric incentives to form an FTA. Given other things being equal, the more industrialized country is enthusiastic, while the less industrialized country is reluctant. The intuition is clear. The more industrialized country derives a large beneÞt from the opening of the partner's relatively large market. In addition, opening its own market for the partner's Þrms does not signiÞcantly increase the import payments since the resulting penetration by the partner's Þrms to the relatively small domestic market is small. Another important factor that affects the incentives to form an FTA is the difference in the original tariff rates. It is easy to see that if t j is higher than
. Country i's export to country j increases more than its import from country j, and hence the FTA between i and j tends to be more beneÞcial to country i.
Stable Free Trade Networks
An FTA that involves more than two countries can be considered as a collection of bilateral FTAs between member countries when costs to form bilateral FTAs are negligible. Therefore, it is convenient to describe FTAs in terms of simple graph theory terminologies. An FTA between countries i and j is described by a link, which is an unordered pair of two countries.
A graph is a collection of links among the countries in the world. An FTA graph is a nondirected graph, (N, Γ) that is a pair consisting the set of countries N and a (free trade)
network Γ that is a collection of links. The set of partners of i ∈ N in a network Γ is
As we have already described, we include i in the set of partners of i just for notational simplicity. This set describes the set of countries with which country i has FTAs. Country i imposes a tariff if and only if that commodity is imported from a country that is outside of these countries. We continue to write it as C i without confusion, if a network Γ is Þxed.
If tariff rates are exogenously determined, or if they are determined uniquely by an existing free trade network Γ (such as the case where all countries set their individual optimal tariffs given the prevailing network Γ), then country i's payoff (social welfare) can be written uniquely by u i (Γ). Consequently, the set of countries N and their payoff functions deÞne a network formation game.
Network formation games are Þrst studied by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) . A pairwise stable network is a network Γ * such that (i) for any i, j ∈ N with i 6 = j and (i, j) ∈ Γ * , j) ), i.e., for any pair of linked countries, neither country has an incentive to cut the link, and (ii) for any i, j ∈ N with i 6 = j and j) ), i.e., for any pair of non-linked countries, at least one of them has no incentive to form a link with the other. 26 We are particularly interested in the situation where the entire world consists of a large free trade area (the global free trade). This situation can also be described by a graph theory terminology. A complete graph is a graph (N, Γ comp ) that contains all possible links: i.e., for 26 The readers may be tempted to formulate a strategic form game in which each player (country) announces names of players she wants to be linked, and a link is formed if and only if both sides of the link announce the other players' names. However, if we use Nash equilibrium as a solution concept of such a game, there are too many Nash equilibria including an outcome without any link. It is because a player has no incentive to announce another player's name who does not announce her name. For a reÞnement of Nash equilibrium in such games (coalition-proof Nash equilibrium), see Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) .
any i, j ∈ N with i 6 = j, (i, j) ∈ Γ comp . We call Γ comp a complete network. The global free trade is a complete graph of the free trade network formation game.
Symmetric Countries
We say that countries i and j are symmetric if s i = s j and µ i = µ j . We derive our main results conÞning ourselves to the case in which the world consists of n symmetric countries so that s i = µ i = 1/n for any i ∈ N . In this case, the effects on country i's industrial trade surplus can be simpliÞed as follows,
(third country effect)≥0
.
Countries' cooperation structure affects the impact of the FTA between i and j on country i's industrial trade surplus through its effects on commodity demands. This effect is particularly important under symmetry: What matters to country i is the size of C i and the size of C j .
We deÞne c k = |C k | for notational simplicity. Under symmetry, for example, we then have
Let us say that countries i and j are completely symmetric if they are symmetric and c i = c j . If the original tariffs are the same between completely symmetric countries i and
, and hence we have ∆q
Thus, the direct surplus effect disappears if countries i and j are completely symmetric and their original tariffs are the same at t. An increase in country i's export to country j and an increase in country i's import from county j are completely canceled out. 27 On the other hand, the third country effect is present and is positive, if there are third countries. Thus, and s j = 1/n, and similarly for country j, when the free trade network is Γ comp \(i, j), we have s
it follows from Lemma 3 and Remark 1 that a consumer's gross utility in countries i and j also strictly increases. Therefore, we have
implying that Γ comp is a stable network.
Q.E.D. it may outweigh the third country effect. This can occur when country j has many FTAs with other countries, while country i has a small number of FTAs. The following numerical example illustrates this. As a benchmark, we set each country's tariff rate at the optimal level without FTAs (s i = s C i = 1/n), i.e., τ (n) ≡ τ i (1/n, 1/n; α, β, δ).
Example 1 Suppose that countries are symmetric, n = 12 and δ = 12β. Suppose further that t i = τ (n) for any i ∈ N . In this case, graph Notice that under the graph Γ −1 , country 1 and other countries become most asymmetric to each other, thus country 1 has the least incentive to form FTAs with others. The intuition for country 1 having no incentive to form a bilateral FTA with any other country is as follows. When δ is large, consumer demands are price sensitive. This means that, in the absence of an FTA, country 1 does not import much of industrial commodities, and most of industrial commodities consumed are domestically produced. However, once country 1 signs an FTA with country 2, say, much of (about a half of) domestic commodity consumption is substituted by commodities produced in country 2 since they all have the same price after the FTA. Therefore, country 1 experiences a dramatic increase in its import payments.
In contrast, country 2 has opened up its market for all but country 1 before the FTA.
Consequently, the FTA with country 1 does not increase its import much even if δ is large.
Therefore, the direct surplus effect of country 1 is negative and is large in its magnitude, which outweighs the third country effect and the effect on
If δ is not very large, on the other hand, even when country 1 has no FTA with other countries, the share of domestic commodities is limited. Then, opening its market for country 2 does not have a large negative effect on country 1's industrial trade surplus. Thus, for a lower value of δ, it seems likely that country 1 has an incentive to have an FTA with country 2 given a positive third country effect.
In the following, we seek a parameter restriction on the values of δ and t that guarantees that every pair of countries has incentive to form an FTA regardless of their existing FTAs.
In such a case, it is obvious that the complete graph (global free trade) becomes the unique pairwise stable network.
Lemma 4
Suppose that countries i and j are symmetric and that the external tariffs are the same, i.e., t i = t j = t. Then, regardless of free trade networks of these two countries with the rest of the world, ∆(X i − M i ) > 0 holds if the following condition is satisÞed.
If the optimal tariff rate, derived in Lemma 2, is smaller than
, we can conclude that a bilateral FTA between symmetric countries i and j increases the industrial trade surplus for these countries regardless of the network structure, under the mild condition that their external tariffs are not greater than their optimal tariffs. The next proposition states that it is indeed the case if the industrial commodities are not highly substitutable.
Proposition 2 Suppose that there are n symmetric countries in the world, and that their external tariff rates are the same at t that is not greater than the optimal tariff rate without any FTA, i.e., τ (n) = τ i (1/n, 1/n; α, β, δ). Suppose further that δ ≤ 6β. Then, under any network Γ, any pair of countries i and j without a bilateral FTA has incentives to form a free trade link. As a result, the global free trade (a complete network Γ comp ) is the unique stable network.
The signiÞcance of this proposition is that it applies regardless of these two countries'
existing FTAs (with other countries). 29 Consider the case where there exist several free trade areas, possibly different in the size. If the industrial commodities are not extremely substitutable, any pair of countries from different free trade areas has incentives to form an FTA. As far as trading blocs take the form of free trade areas, as opposed to customs union, they are likely to be "building blocs" instead of "stumbling blocs" towards the global free trade when countries are symmetric. 29 Proposition 2 suggests that as far as countries myopically make decisions as to whether or not they have
FTAs with other countries, the world free trade network will eventually reach the complete network such that global free trade is effectively attained.
Asymmetric Countries
Now, let us turn to an asymmetric country case. Under general values of substitution parameter δ, unfortunately, it is very hard to obtain any analytical result. Thus, in this subsection, we assume δ = 0 in order to simplify the analysis. This is deÞnitely not an ideal assumption, since it makes each commodity demand completely independent, and, as a result, the existing FTA network becomes irrelevant for country i's incentive to sign an FTA with country j. The third country effects vanish, too. Despite of all of these, it is a convenient assumption to illustrate how asymmetry of countries affect the resulting FTA network. Since country i's optimal tariff rate is constant irrespective of s i , µ i , and C i , we can naturally assume that each country imposes the optimal tariff rate, t = for commodities with tariffs. In this special case of no substitution, we can explicitly calculate social welfare of each country easily. Since commodity demand is independent of each other when δ = 0, we can calculate
where v(t) and q(t), (v(0) and q(0)) are per capita utility and per capita consumption of a commodity with tariff (without tariff). Producer prices of commodities with and without tariff are denoted by p(t) and p(t), respectively. As is easily seen from Figures 1 and 2 ,
, and
Thus, social welfere of country i can be written as,
If countries i and j sign an FTA, then j joins C i . Thus, the impact on country i's welfare is, As we discussed in Section 3.1, the direct surplus effect depends on two countries' levels of industrialization. If countries are symmetric, our Proposition 2 applies, and ∆W i is always positive. 30 By rearranging the above formula, we obtain, 
Customs Unions vs. Free Trade Areas
The literature has usually focused on the difference between customs unions and free trade areas in member countries' external optimal tariff rates. In contrast, we investigate in this section the difference in member countries' incentives to sign a new FTA emphasizing the fact that a customs union requires all members' consent when a member country wants to sign an FTA with an outside country. Customs union impose constraints on admissible FTAs to be signed. Our main goal of the paper is to assess how far the process of PTAs continues and whether or not global free trade is effectively attained as a complete world-wide web of Let us begin with investigating the impact on a consumer's gross utility V i . As we have seen in Section 3.1, the impact on V i is ambiguous in both cases. However, these effects are exactly the same between the two cases, since V i only depends on t i and changes in t i are the same between the two cases. Thus, the difference in changes of the industrial trade surplus between these two cases will determine whether or not country i's incentive to have an FTA with country j is higher in the case where C i is a customs union rather than a free trade area. Here, we decompose the third country effect into two:
where country k is a representative partner of i, i.e., k ∈ C i \{i}, and country l is a representative outsider of i, i.e., l / ∈ C i ∪ {j}. The following table compares these two cases item by item. 31 Free Trade Area Customs Union
We start with M i j , country i's import payments from country j. Since country i's import is solely determined by t i and country i's post-FTA tariff vectors are the same between the two cases, the effects are exactly the same. This effect is positive since country i lowers its tariff rate for commodities imported from country j. In contrast, the effects on
are different especially when |C i \{i}| is large. It is because country j eliminates tariffs against all countries in C i in the case of the customs union while it eliminates tariffs only for commodities imported from country i in the case of free trade area. Since industrial commodities are substitutes among themselves, it is obvious that an increase in X i j is smaller in the case of customs union. Consequently, the direct surplus effect is lower in the case of customs union than in the case of free trade area.
Next, we investigate the effects on country i's industrial trade surplus with a member country k ∈ C i \{i}. As before, the effects on
are the same in both cases.
However, the effects on
In the case of free trade area, t k is unaffected and hence X i k does not change. In the case of customs union, on the other hand, country k also eliminates tariffs against country j, and country i's export to country k is reduced due to the substitution effect. Country i's industrial trade surplus with a member 31 We include ∆V i for convenience. Signs of the effects of having an FTA with country j are not known, which are described by "?" in the table. The observation that these effects are the same is described by "=."
country k is again lower in the case of customs union. Finally, it is easy to see that the third country effect with nonmembers is the same in both cases. Import payments from country l decreases by the same amount due to the tariff reductions for commodities imported from country j, and country i's export to country l stays the same in both cases since t k is not affected.
We have shown that the impacts of a new FTA on consumer's gross utility are the same between the two cases, but the effect on the industrial trade surplus is unambiguously lower in the case of customs union. We record this result as a lemma.
Lemma 5 Country i has less incentive to have an FTA with country j / ∈ C i when C i forms a customs union rather than a free trade area (or the case where country i has FTAs with other countries in C i ), unless the industrial goods are independent from one another, i.e., δ = 0, in which case the incentives are the same.
In the symmetric country case with low subsititution parameter δ, we can make a strong statement. Proposition 2 says that free trade areas are more preferable in that sense if all countries are symmetric, and δ is not very high. In such a situation, country j has an incentive to have an FTA with any country, in particular with country i alone and with an integrated economy consisting of all countries in C i . Therefore, country j wants to have an FTA with country i whether C i forms a customs union or free trade area. Combining this observation together with Lemma 5, we have shown the following proposition.
Proposition 4 An FTA is less likely to be signed if a country involved is a member of a customs union rather than a free trade area if all countries are symmetric, imposing the same external tariffs rate, and 0 < δ ≤ 6β, i.e., the industrial commodities are not highly substitutable among themselves.
The intuition for this result can come from the prisoners' dilemma game: customs union has a power to coordinate the actions (not to sign FTAs with outsiders) among the members and can attain a cooperation outcome, while free trade area cannot force a member to defect by signing an FTA with an outsider. In the following, we show by an example that these two regimes may generate very different predictions in stable allocations. As we have seen in Proposition 2, as long as countries are symmetric and commodities are not highly substitutable with one another (δ ≤ 6β), the network formation process in FTAs results in global free trade, i.e., the complete graph is the unique pairwise stable network.
How about the customs union case? A customs union formation problem may be best described as a coalition formation problem. Yi (1996) analyzes customs union formation problem among symmetric countries by employing a coalition bargaining game analyzed by Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999) . 32 Coalition bargaining game is an extension of the Rubinstein bargaining problem to an n-player game with endogenous coalition structures. In each period an exogenously chosen proposer calls a coalition to form, and then the members of the called coalition choose to accept or reject the offer in order. If all members accept, then the coalition is formed, and the rest of players play the same game among them. In the (Markov) perfect equilibrium, the Þrst proposer chooses a coalition that maximizes her payoff among the ones that are acceptable to the members by foreseeing which coalitions are formed afterwards by the rest of the players. In the context of customs union formation, Yi (1996) shows that in equilibrium, at most two customs unions with different size are formed for reasonable numbers of countries. Although our model is different from Yi's in details, we can obtain qualitatively similar outcomes. This implies that equilibrium (or stable) outcomes in PTA formation processes can be very different depending on the rules: whether PTAs are customs unions or free trade areas. The following example illustrates this point.
Example 2 Suppose that countries are symmetric, n = 50 and δ = 5β. Suppose further that each country sets its tariff rate at τ (n), the optimal level without any FTA. In this case, Proposition 2 suggests that a unique stable network in the FTA regime is the complete graph In the above, we considered the case where outsiders always have incentives to sign FTAs with the members of free trade group. Let us turn to the investigation whether or not country j's incentive to have an FTA with country i is lower when C i forms a customs union 32 See Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999) for details. Note that we cannot utilize typical solution such as the core in cooperative game theory. Our problem involves externalities across customs unions (coalitions), although typical cooperative games (characteristic function form games) do not allow such externalities. 33 This implies that global free trade cannot be the equilibrium outcome of the coalition bargaining game.
In contrast, Proposition 2 implies that the above allocation with two customs unions is not pairwise stable:
two customs unions have incentives to form an FTA, leading to global free trade.
rather than a free trade area. The difference between the two cases in our terminology is that country j adds only one link with country i in the case of free trade area whereas in the case of customs union country j adds c i links simultaneously with all individual countries in C i . To see the difference in country j's incentives, we Þrst notice that the latter case is effectively equivalent to the case where country j has an FTA with an integrated economy that consists of all countries in C i . That is, country j's potential partner produces s C i industrial commodities rather than s i , and its population is µ
in the case of customs union (thus, is satisÞed for each k = 1, ..., n − 1, customs union may work as "building blocs".
34
[Taiji-san, Do you think we need the following part of the paper?]
To see the effect of C j being a customs union, we calculate ∂∆V i /∂s j from (17) in the proof of Lemma 3 in the Appendix to obtain
which is more likely to be positive if s C i + s j is large as we can infer from the second best theory. Whether or not consumer's gross utility increases more (or decreases less) in the case of customs union is generally ambiguous, however. The same is true in the impacts on 34 However, we should note that history of customs union expansions may matter. It might be possible for the customs union expansion process stumbles if there are two unions fromed by developed countries only and developing countries only. If two unions' levels of industrialization differ too much, then the process stumbles the industrial trade surplus. We have shown in Section 3.1 that an increase in country i's industrial trade surplus is more likely to be positive and large if the partner country is less industrialized. Thus, the less industrialized and the more populated countries in C j \{j}, the more likely that an increment in country i's industrial trade surplus is larger in the case where C j is a customs union than in the case where it is a free trade area.
Lemma 6 Whether or not country i's incentive to have an FTA with country j is lower when C j forms a customs union rather than a free trade area is ambiguous. However, country i's incentive is more likely to be lower if s C i + s C j is small and countries in C j \{j} is more industrialized on average than country j.
It follows immediately from Lemma 6 that which forms of PTA should be encouraged in order to facilitate FTA formation is generally ambiguous.
Concluding Remarks
We have introduced a very general analytical framework that is suitable to the investigation of PTAs and shown how countries' incentives vary with the country size, industrialization level, substitutability among industrial commodities, etc. We have found that if all countries are symmetric, a complete global free trade network is pairwise stable and that it is a unique stable network if industrial commodities are not highly substitutable from one another. We also have shown that in such a situation, countries have less incentives to have an FTA if one of the countries is a member of a customs union rather than a free trade area, and shown an example in which expansion of customs union stagnates while adding free trade networks enables the world to attain global free trade.
We must note that all of such results are obtained under the assumption that external tariffs are Þxed when countries form PTAs. Since Lemma 2 implies that a country's optimal tariffs decrease as the country have more free trade links, countries would lower their external tariffs as they form more free trade links. It is interesting to know how these tariff adjustments affect countries incentives to form PTAs. We leave this extension for future research.
35 35 It is indeed difficult to obtain an analytical result for this case in general free trade network formation games. Our initial numerical analyses on n symmetric country case show that even if the optimal tariffs are
Since country j 0 s tariffs on country i 0 s commodities only affect demands for those commodities in country j, we obtain
Proof of Lemma 2. First, we extend the results of Lemma 1 by substituting (6) into the formulae.
constantly adjusted in the process of free trade network formation, a variant of Proposition 2 holds: Social welfare improves by forming a new bilateral free trade agreement under any kind of free trade networks, if δ is not very high and n is reasonably large.
Noticing that X i does not depend on t i j , we have
The right-hand side of this formula is common for any j. Thus, the value of t i j is independent of j, so that we may express t
Thus, the optimal tariff rate τ i is obtained as a function of s i , s C i , and parameters α, β and δ.
It is easy to see that ∂τ i /∂s i > 0 and ∂τ i /∂s C i < 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3. Using (6), we have
By substituting this result and (6) into ∂V i /∂t i j in Lemma 1, we obtain
Let t(γ) denote the bilateral tariff reform schedule between countries i and j. This schedule satisÞes t 
By integrating over γ, the welfare change of country i due to the FTA with j becomes
The sufficient condition (i) immediately follows.
Let us suppose now that the condition (i) does not hold so that the terms in the square brackets of the last equation in the above are negative. Then the condition (ii) also follows immediately.
In order to derive the sufficient condition δ ≤ 10β for (ii), we consider the case where s k = 1/n for any k. Since the original tariff rate t i is less than or equal to the optimal tariff τ i , we need only show that if δ ≤ 10β condition (ii) holds when t i = τ i . Now, ∆V i > 0 if and only if
Recall that we only consider the case where the denominator of the left-hand side is positive.
As Lemma 2 shows, the optimal tariff decreases in s C i . To derive the condition under which (ii) holds for any s C i , therefore, we substitute s i = 1/n, which is the smallest s
Then, the optimal tariff rate that we substitute for t i in the above inequality equals
Noticing that the left-hand side of (18) decreases by substituting s i for s C i , the inequality that we need to verify can be written as
Further computation shows that this inequality can be reduced to
To simplify the expressions, we let x = 1/n. Then, it follows fromδ = 1 −β that the above inequality holds if the following function takes a nonnegative value for any x ∈ (0, 1/2] and anyβ ∈ [0, 1]. , which in turn holds ifβ ≥ 1/11.
Together with the fact that g(0,β) ≥ 0 ifβ ≥ 1 15 , it implies that g(x, β) ≥ 0 for any x ∈ (0, 1/2] and for anyβ ∈ [0, 1] ifβ ≥ 1/11, or equivalently, δ ≤ 10β.
Proof of Lemma 4. Recall from the proof of Lemma 3 the deÞnition of the bilateral tariff reform schedule between countries i and j, denoted by t(γ) where t 
Consequently, we have
Now, we can rewrite a change in country i's industrial trade surplus. The value of this formula is minimized when c i = 1 and c j = n − 1. Thus, , and hence the industrial trade surplus does not change as we argue in Footnote 27. Then, it follows from Lemma 3 that if δ ≤ 10β, countries i and j have incentives to sign an FTA.
If n ≥ 3, on the other hand, the upperbound for t in Lemma 4 becomes important. As Lemma 2 shows, the optimal tariff is highest when a country does not have any FTA, i.e.,
Thus, in the case of n (≥ 3) symmetric countries, the optimal tariff rate under any cooperation structures is bounded above by τ (n). Now, let us examine how τ (n) varies with Now, we calculate the optimal tariff rate when n = 3. This value is nonnegative if and only if δ ≤ 6β. Thus, as long as δ ≤ 6β (as we have seen before, δ ≤ 9β guarantees that τ (n) is decreasing in n for n ≥ 3), the condition in Lemma 4
is satisÞed when n ≥ 3. Moreover, if δ ≤ 6β, then δ ≤ 10β is also satisÞed, so that Lemma 2 implies that a consumer's gross utility increases by the FTA. Consequently, countries i and j have incentives to have an FTA if δ ≤ 6β.
Q.E.D.
